TT:
APETT cautions on the proposed Rapid Rail Project
(I)
Trinidad
Express
Port
Spain
Petroleumworld.com
09 10 06
The
Association of Professional Engineers of Trinidad
and Tobago (APETT) has expressed its concerns regarding
the Government's proposed Trinidad Rapid Rail Project.
The following is the first in a two part series
prepared by the group.
APETT
is extremely concerned about the Government of Trinidad
and Tobago's approach to the planning and implementation
of the proposed Trinidad Rapid Rail Project, (TRRP)
scheduled to start by the end of the year. Our main
concern is that the Government is about to commit
taxpayers to an expenditure of tens of billions
of dollars without doing the necessary analysis
to determine if this is the best and most cost-effective
way of achieving the stated goals.
At a recent breakfast forum hosted
by APETT, presenters and participants alike raised
several questions about the project. Unfortunately,
no representative of the consultants, Parsons Brinckerhoff,
or the Ministry of Works and Transport accepted
the invitation to attend. The questions have therefore
remained unanswered.
The Institute of Transportation
Engineers (ITE) in its internationally recognised
and used best practice guide: Transportation Planning
Handbook, 2nd. Ed. p. 422 states: -
"The MIS (Major Investment
Study) is reserved for situations where it is clear
that a large investment is required and offers a
rigorous method to evaluate the trade-offs, for
example, between additional expressway lanes, HOV(High
Occupancy Vehicle) lanes or fixed guideway rail
transit. Just as the public and stakeholder groups
were involved in the development of the plan, this
same requirement exists on a more focused basis
for the MIS."
The key element in these studies
is that the planners should recognise the importance
of having an open process that broadly examines
corridor solutions without preconceived biases.
It is instructive to note that the
Vision 2020 sub-committee on Infrastructure, comprising
professionals, technocrats and managers from both
the public and private sectors reviewed the state
of the transportation sector and the Government's
plans for land transportation improvements. The
sub-committee recognised that the Government was
in the process of developing a National Physical
Development Plan (NPDP) that would inform land-use
planning and control over the medium to long term
and that a Comprehensive National Transportation
Study (CNTS) for Trinidad and Tobago would be prepared
by 2007. As such, the sub-committee felt that detailed
project identification in the medium to long term
was not practical at this time. In other words,
a project such as the proposed TRRP should be considered
only after the NPDP and CNTS. To date, neither of
these studies has been completed nor even their
preliminary findings made subject to public scrutiny.
Yet, the Government is inviting tenders for Phase
1 TRRP. This is a clear case of putting the cart
before the horse.
The only justification that we have
heard for this undue haste is that the traffic situation
is critical and requires immediate action. While
the situation is indeed critical, unless we understand
how it came to be, we cannot be sure that the massive
expenditure estimated at over $20 billion in capital
works and an annual expenditure of $3 billion will
truly solve the problem. Furthermore, when faced
with a critical problem, the first requirement is
proper planning. The second is proper management
of existing resources. In the case of the TRRP there
is a marked absence of both of these ingredients.
Contrary to uninformed popular thinking, the country
does not suffer from too much planning and analysis.
What it is suffering from is too little implementation
of what is planned on the one hand, and too much
unplanned implementation on the other.
A review of the history of development
of the land transportation sector over the last
40 years since the National Transportations Plan
of 1967 would reveal why we are in the position
of gridlock today. Firstly, the NTP of 1967 did
not deal adequately with the role of public transportation
nor did it detail plans for meaningful growth of
the sector. Furthermore, many of the proposed highway
developments were not implemented. Indeed many of
the projects currently being undertaken were first
identified as necessary during that plan. The main
reason given for this failure to implement was a
lack of funding. Subsequently, the East-West Corridor
study of 1973-74 by Lea-Trintoplan examined the
passenger movement requirements of the corridor
and recommended the Priority Bus Route (PBR) as
an exclusive HOV roadway as well as major highway
improvements, including the Southern Link Freeway.
It also reiterated the need for
urban highways identified in 1967. These recommendations
were only partially implemented - again, through
lack of funding. Moreover, the PBR, was never fully
developed as a HOV roadway, the Public Transport
Service Corporation (PTSC) was never fully equipped
to maximise its usage, and the maxi-taxi industry
was never properly planned, organised and managed
to provide optimal service at minimal tax-payer
expense. Interestingly, a Light Rail alternative
to the PBR was considered during the planning stage,
but after evaluation, it was not identified as the
preferred option. Since then, the Government's policies
ranging from the subsidisation of gasoline to the
ease with which foreign-used cars can be imported
into the country, have moved the car ownership rates
to almost one car per every three persons.
For a project of this magnitude
and significance, a pre-feasibility study ought
to have been done long before developers were asked
to tender. APETT's investigations have not unearthed
any such study. In the absence of transparent and
readily-available information on the analysis which
is driving the fast-tracking of the TRRP ahead of
the completion of the CNTS, we are left to examine
the proposed 129km system based on the scant information
given by the consultant, Parsons Brinckerhoff, in
its informational meeting with potential bidders
on March 14 2006 and using international empirical
data as a benchmark.
Our preliminary estimate is that
the
system would have a capital cost in the vicinity
of TT$20 billion with an annual operating and maintenance
cost of about $3 billion per year. Most likely,
this would be heavily subsidised by the Government.
This massive commitment dwarfs the 2005 capital
subsidy to the PTSC of TT$45 million with an annual
recurrent support of $80 million.
Additionally, the current institutional
arrangements are too weak to support the proper
management and administration of the public transportation
sector. There is no agency currently responsible
for the planning and administration of the public
transport sector. Even within the Ministry of Works,
there is no department or section with the necessary
staff and mandate to carry out those functions.
Furthermore, the Government does not have the capability
for the ongoing analysis of the demand for public
transport services and the quality of service being
supplied to the public, by region or otherwise disaggregated.
Consequently, the Government is
unable to assess the most cost-effective interventions
that would create the greatest benefit. Into this
milieu, the Government now proposes to spend $20
billion and a further $3 billion per year on a rail
system, ostensibly without even the benefit of a
pre-feasibility study.
For further information please contact Mark François,
President APETT, 623-0789 or 680-3825.
Trinidad Express
Wednesday, August 30th 2006
Copyright
©2006 Trinidad Express . All Rights Reserved.
