Rail
or real panic?
By Rae Furlonge Traffic and Transport Engi
Trinidad
& Tobago Newsday
Port Spain
Petroleumworldtt.com
09 16 07
In the book, Financing Transport Infrastructure,
with Sheila Farrell as editor, Richard Scurfield
laments that risks are rarely addressed in the
preparation of public sector construction contracts.
Considerable risks are associated with mega-projects
like the Trinidad Rapid Rail Transit (TRRP), particularly
in countries where there is limited experience,
like ours.
Risks include:
*Absence of alternative uses for a railway if
demand proves to be insufficient
*The limited value of a partially constructed
railway system
*The possibility that revenue over the life of
a concession will be lower than expected, and thus
resulting in high subsidies
*The risk of higher than expected construction
or financing costs
*Will the project receive the necessary legislative
and regulatory authorisations to be permitted to
proceed?
*Will the facility be operated as required, provide
the expected level-of-service, be adequately maintained
so that its continued operation is assured, incur
costs within budget and revenue forecasts?
*Will inflation and the general economic environment
over the life of the concession affect project
cost, project demand and project revenues? Is there
adequate protection against inflation?
* Will there be political commitment to procurement
up to award of a contract and then afterwards,
will subsequent regulatory and legislative initiatives
adversely affect the viability of the project?
If there is a change in political administration,
will the project continue?
Failure to engage in meaningful, informed decision-making
on relevant issues exposes us to significant inefficiencies
both foreseen and unforeseen.
The
more complex the undertaking, the more important
is the issue of communications. There must be no “spin,” and
no dodging of issues. There must be consistent,
reliable flow of useful, usable information. There
must be honesty, timeliness, simplicity, ease of
access, relevance, no unclear messages, with the
content lost in transmission. Emphasis should tend
towards inclusion not exclusion.
Lest
we forget, the Government commissioned Parsons
Brinckerhoff (PB) in February 2005 to conduct a
Comprehensive National Transport Study (CNTS),
and this was to be completed by September 2006.
In January 2006, Government had PB arrange some
other team members to procure contractors by November
2006 for a complete plan-design-build-operate-maintain
(PDBOM) programme for a 120-km rapid rail system
for Trinidad. At the first Informational Meeting
for prospective contractors for the TRRP at Crowne
Plaza, PoS on March 14, 2006, the Minister of Works
and Transport stated that “the Government
has decided that the preferred mode of mass transit
is rapid rail as it is appropriate at this time
to re-introduce rail…and Government believes
this … and is committed to fast-track the
rapid rail project.”
In
September 2006 PB’s rapid rail team was
fired, and other consultants hired who were not
made public until September 2007 in the Senate.
The
Minister responded to questions in the Senate
on July 3, 2007 that “the final report [CNTS]
was sent back to the consultants [PB] because the
ministry was not satisfied with the quality of
the report. The firm of PB was giving us an undertaking
to remedy the defects in the report.” The
date for submission was by August 3, 2007, and
from all appearances this has not been met. So
after nearly two and a half years of international
experts studying our nation’s transportation
planning, there is nothing to show.
RAIL CONTRACT$
Mr. Imbert said that the contract for the CNTS
was for $21m, of which approximately $10M had been
paid. The second study which was taken away from
PB, The Mass Transit Study, was worth $37 million,
and $5.5M had so far been paid. But the TRRP has
been promoted.
In addition to several other proposed transportation
projects, including nearly 100km of freeways and
interchanges, there is now a water taxi system
for the Gulf of Paria, a 350-million dollar multi-level
interchange at the UBH-CRH intersection, the addition
of buses to the state-owned PTSC, and two 1,600-stall
car parks in downtown Port of Spain. Some of these
multi-modal strategies are clearly counter-intuitive,
for example what is the need for several massive
car parks at the destination in Port of Spain if
rapid rail will be taking commuters from their
origins in east, south and central? There appears
to be panicking over mushrooming public outcry
against traffic congestion.
Meanwhile, why have there been no presentations
to and any involvement by the tax-paying public
in these critical activities? What will we do about
congestion in the meantime? Is there nothing that
Government can do for us within the next six months
to three years?
e-mail: info@ccost.org
Trinidad
& Tobago Newsday
Thursday,
September 13 2007
Copyright
©2007 Trinidad
& Tobago Newsday . All Rights Reserved.
